In this paper we present a new proof technique for semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols which makes use of a quantum entropic uncertainty relation to bound an adversary's information. We develop several new techniques for analyzing SQKD protocols; furthermore, our new proof may hold application in the security analysis of other semiquantum protocols or protocols relying on two-way quantum communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols allow for the establishment of a secret key between two parties Alice (A) and Bob (B) which is secure even against an all-powerful adversary Eve (E). However, these QKD protocols, and their security analysis, require both A and B to be "quantum capable." In 2007, Boyer et al., in [1] introduced the semiquantum model of cryptography whereby only A was required to be quantum while B was allowed to be very limited and "classical" in his capabilities. These semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols are interesting to study theoretically as they attempt to answer the question "how quantum does a protocol need to be to gain an advantage over its classical counterpart?" There are also potential practical benefits to studying these protocols: for example, B's device could be cheaper to manufacture; alternatively, one can consider designing a QKD infrastructure more robust to technical failure -if a device ever breaks down, one may switch to a "semiquantum" mode. SQKD protocols, however, require a two-way quantum communication channel (one which allows A to send qubits to B who then sends qubits back to A) greatly increasing the complexity of their security analysis. Though several SQKD protocols have been proposed, it wasn't until 2015, that rigorous proofs of security became available [2] . In a recent work [3] , we showed that the original SQKD protocol of Boyer et al., has a noise tolerance of 11% -exactly the same as the fully-quantum BB84 protocol. Our result in [3] , however, required the use of numerous measurements, including mismatched measurements [4] (e.g., the probability of a |+ being measured as a |0 ). Ultimately, to compute the key-rate of the Boyer et al., protocol, using our technique in that paper, one must look at over 12 different measurement statistics and then evaluate a series of lengthy equations.
There are several contributions made in this work, many of which we expect would hold great application outside the scope of this paper. We show an entirely new approach to proving security of semi-quantum protocols; we show how to convert a particular SQKD protocol into an equivalent entanglement based version and we derive a new key-rate bound which does not require the use of numerous mismatched measurement statistics and which produces a higher noise tolerance than previous work without these statistics, though not as high as with mismatched measurements (the key-rate expression derived here is simpler, though, than both). Note that, in [5] , a technique of converting certain two-way QKD protocols into equivalent entanglement based versions was shown; however their result could only be applied to protocols where B's output is independent of his input averaged over all of his operations -this property is sadly lacking in the semiquantum model and so a new method is required which we introduce in this paper. Finally, our proof shows a new and interesting application of a quantum uncertainty bound to the semi-quantum model of cryptography and also an interesting application of a continuity bound on conditional von Neumann entropy which may be of great use when proving security of new protocols in the semi-quantum model (or other "twoway" protocols) -especially for higher-dimensional protocols where the technique of mismatched measurements can become intractable.
Notation -We assume the reader is familiar with basic quantum information theory and so here we will only introduce our notation and a few general concepts. The computational Z basis is defined to be {|0 , |1 } while the Hadamard X basis
We denote by H(p 1 , · · · , p n ) to be the Shannon entropy of p 1 , · · · , p n . If A and B are random variables, then H(A|B) is the conditional Shannon entropy of A conditioned on B. By h(x) we mean the binary entropy function:
. All logarithms in this paper are base two.
A density operator is a Hermitian positive semi-definite operator of unit trace. If ρ is a density operator acting on Hilbert space H A ⊗ H B , we often write ρ AB . In this case, we write ρ B to mean the operator resulting from tracing out A; i.e., ρ B = tr A ρ AB . Similarly when the operator acts on larger systems. We also will write H AB to denote H A ⊗ H B . Given density operator ρ AB we write S(AB) ρ to mean the von Neumann entropy of ρ AB . We write S(A|B) ρ to mean the conditional von Neumann entropy: S(A|B) ρ = S(AB) ρ −S(B) ρ . If the context is clear, we will forgo writing the subscript "ρ." Given an operator A, we write ||A|| to mean the trace norm of A. If A is Hermitian and finite dimensional, then ||A|| = i |λ i |, where {λ i } are the eigenvalues of A.
If z ∈ C m×n , then we write z * to mean the conjugate transpose of z. Also, we define D = {z ∈ C | |z| ≤ 1}. Finally, we write [a, b] AB to mean |a, b a, b| AB .
(S)QKD Security -A (S)QKD protocol operates in two stages: first a quantum communication stage whereby users establish a raw-key which is an n-bit string which is partially correlated and partially secret. Following the quantum communication stage, a classical stage consisting of error correction and privacy amplification is run producing a secret key of size (n) bits which may then be used for other cryptographic protocols. For collective attacks (defined to be attacks whereby E performs the same attack operation each iteration however is free to postpone measurement of her ancilla until any future time of her choice), the Devetak-Winter key-rate expression [6] states: r := lim n→∞
where the infimum is over all collective attacks which induce the observed noise statistics. Computing a bound on this expression (as a function of observable statistics) is the goal of any (S)QKD security proof [7] .
II. THE PROTOCOL
The protocol we consider is the original SQKD protocol of Boyer et al., introduced in [1] . This protocol, being a semiquantum one, assumes that A is fully quantum in that she can prepare and measure qubits in arbitrary bases; however B is classical in that he can only directly work with the computational Z basis. An SQKD protocol utilizes a two-way quantum channel. We call the channel connecting A to B the forward channel and the channel connecting B to A the reverse channel. A will prepare and send qubits to B who is restricted to choosing between two operations: Measure and Resend or Reflect. If he chooses Measure and Resend, he will subject the incoming qubit to a Z basis measurement and prepare and send to A a new (Z basis) qubit in the same state he observed; if he chooses Reflect he will completely disconnect from the quantum channel, allowing the qubit to pass through his lab undisturbed, and return to A (thus A is "talking to herself").
The protocol we consider, and which we denote as Π SQKD , operates as follows: 1. A chooses to send a qubit of the form |0 , |1 , |+ , or |− , choosing randomly. 2. B will choose to Measure and Resend or to Reflect. If he chooses Measure and Resend he will save his measurement result in a classical register to serve as his potential raw-key bit for this iteration. 3. A will measure in the same basis she used in step 1.
4.
A will disclose her choice of basis; B will disclose his choice of operation (Measure and Resend or Reflect). This is done using an authenticated classical channel.
If A used the Z basis and if B chose to
Measure and Resend, then they will use this iteration to contribute towards their raw-key. A will use her initial preparation choice as her key bit (equivalently, she may use her measurement result at the end -our security analysis will apply to both cases). Other iterations, along with a suitably sized random subset of these "raw-key" iterations, may be used for error estimation.
It is not difficult to see that the protocol is correct. We analyze its security by determining a new lower-bound on the Devetak-Winter key-rate expression for this protocol.
III. SECURITY PROOF
We prove security against collective attacks in this paperwe will comment on general attacks later. In the semi-quantum model, a collective attack is a pair of unitary operators
Our proof of security follows three steps. First, we will prove that for any (qubit-based) semi-quantum protocol, it is sufficient to consider a particular "restricted" collective attack. Second, using this result, we show how to convert the protocol of interest into a mathematically equivalent entanglement based version (where both A and B are now quantum). Third, we use a quantum uncertainty bound and a continuity bound on conditional entropy to analyze the entanglement based version -security of the SQKD protocol will then follow. (See Figure  1 in the full version [8] for a pictorial view of the proof.)
Restricted Attacks -We show that, to analyze security against collective attacks, it is sufficient to analyze a restricted form of attack. This extends a result and answers an open question from [9] (which could only be used for singlestate SQKD protocols [10] ) to arbitrary multi-state SQKD protocols.
and U is a unitary operator acting on H T ⊗ H E . The attack consists of the following two actions: 1. In the forward channel, E applies the isometry F, mapping H T to H T E which acts on |v i as follows:
whereq i = 1 − q 2 i , and:
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Note that it is not difficult to see, considering the restrictions on the values η 0 , η 1 , q 0 , and q 1 , that F is an isometry and may therefore be easily extended to a unitary operator; thus this is an operation E can perform within the laws of quantum physics. 2. In the reverse channel, E applies the unitary operator U .
When the context is clear, we will simply call the above attack a restricted attack as opposed to its longer title. The following theorem proves that it is sufficient to consider these restricted attacks when proving security of any semi-quantum protocol against arbitrary collective attacks. Theorem 1. Let B = {|v 0 , |v 1 } be an arbitrary orthonormal basis. For every collective attack C = (U F , U R ), there exists a restricted attack R = (q 0 , q 1 , η 0 , η 1 , U ) such that, for any SQKD protocol with quantum A and classical B, the following are true: 1. A and B cannot distinguish between attack C and R; 2. E's final quantum system is the same regardless of whether she used C or R; and 3. the key-rate is equal under both attacks.
Proof. See the full version of the paper [8] .
In the remainder of this paper, we take B = Z = {|0 , |1 }. Also note that our proof would hold even for protocols where B performs a CNOT gate (acting on H T and his private register) instead of a projective Z basis measurement when he chooses Measure and Resend.
An Entanglement Based Protocol -Define Π SQKD to be the protocol where B's Measure and Resend operation is modeled as a CNOT gate (instead of a projective measurement) and where A prepares a Bell state 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ), sending one particle to B and keeping the other to herself (later, when a particle returns, she will measure both in the Z or X basis). It is not difficult to show that security of this protocol implies security of Π SQKD . Also, Theorem 1 still applies (see the comment after the proof). Now, consider the following protocol with two quantum users (B is no longer "classical"), which we denote by Π * :
if he wishes to "Reflect" otherwise he prepares the state √ p 0 |000 A1A2B + √ p 1 |111 A1A2B if he wishes to "Measure and Resend" (he will chose the operation randomly each iteration). The two qubits A 1 and A 2 are sent to Alice. Note that the terminology "Measure and Resend" and "Reflect" no longer has any real meaning in this protocol.
2.
A receives both particles A 1 and A 2 and will measure each in the Z basis or the X basis, choosing randomly.
3. If B chooses to Measure and Resend and if A uses the Z basis, they may use their results as their raw-key bit (we assume A 1 is used as A's raw-key bit, though our analysis below would be symmetric if A 2 were used instead). Other iterations, along with a random subset of these "raw-key" iterations, may be used for error estimation.
We give E the ability to control the setting of p 0 and p 1 which can only increase her power. A collective attack against this protocol, thus, is a setting for p 0 (with p 1 = 1 − p 0 ) and a unitary operator U acting on two qubits A 1 and A 2 and E's private quantum memory.
While Π * is not a "true" entanglement-based version (as B is making a choice between two pure states), it would not be difficult to make it one simply by increasing the dimension of B's space with an extra qubit (which, after measuring, would determine his choice of Measure and Resend or Reflect). However, Π * will be sufficient to complete our security analysis of the prepare-and-measure protocol.
We claim that, if Π * is secure, then so is Π SQKD (in which case, so is Π SQKD ). In particular, given an attack against Π SQKD , we will construct an attack against Π * which first "rewinds" the forward channel attack simulating (for all three parties) the system had A initially sent a qubit as opposed to B. The only thing E cannot "rewind" is the probability of B observing certain outcomes in Π SQKD -thus the need for her to set the value of p 0 during device construction. Theorem 2. Let (U F , U R ) be a collective attack used against Π SQKD and let ρ ABE be the density operator describing a single iteration of this protocol Π SQKD when E uses this attack. Then, there exists an attack E = (p 0 , U ) against Π * such that, if σ ABE is the resulting density operator when running Π * using attack E, it holds that ρ ABE = σ ABE .
Proof. (We only construct the attack here -for the full proof, see the full version of this paper [8] .) Let (U F , U R ) be a collective attack against Π SQKD . Since Theorem 1 applies, there exists an equivalent restricted attack consisting of the forward operator F as described in Equation 1. We construct the desired attack E against Π * .
Consider the following operator Rw to be used against Π * in order to "rewind" the forward channel attack. The action of this operator is:
where |e and |f are the states resulting from the application of F (see Equation 2 ). It can be shown that Rw is an isometry (and thus is a valid operation for E to perform). Finally, the desired attack against Π * is:
). It can be shown that this attack satisfies the requirements of the Theorem (see full version of the paper [8] ).
Thus, to prove security of Π SQKD (and thus Π SQKD , our goal), it suffices to analyze Π * as E has potentially more attack capabilities against the latter. Indeed, we have the following "chain:" Π * =⇒ Π * res =⇒ Π SQKD =⇒ Π SQKD , where Π * res is the protocol Π * but with E restricted to attacks of the form E = (p 0 , (I A1 ⊗ U ) · Rw).
Final Key-Rate Bound -There are two "modes" to Π * : either B chooses to Measure and Resend (with probability P M ) or he chooses to Reflect (with probability P R ).
A single iteration of the protocol, then, may be written as the density operator:
where σ A1A2BE is the (pure) state in the event B chooses Measure and Resend while τ A1A2BE is the (pure) state when B chooses Reflect. Since only Measure and Resend contributes to the raw-key, to compute the key-rate, we must bound S(A Z 1 |E) σ , where A Z 1 is the result of A measuring A 1 in the Z basis. However, we will first analyze S(A Z 1 |E) τ . Lemma 1. Let τ A1A2BE be the state of the system if B chooses Reflect in protocol Π * and let Q X be the error rate in the X basis between registers A 1 and A 2 (the probability that A 1 = + and A 2 = −). Then:
It was shown in [11] , that for any density operator acting on a tripartite Hilbert space H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H E , that if A and B make measurements in the Z or X basis, then the following uncertainty relation holds: S(A Z |E) + S(A X |B) ≥ 1, where we use A Z (respectively A X ) to denote the register storing the result of a Z (respectively X) basis measurement on the A system. Returning to our system of interest τ A1A2BE , note that B is completely independent of the A 1 A 2 E system, thus, we may simply consider the state resulting from tracing out B which acts on the tripartite system H A1 ⊗ H A2 ⊗ H E . Using the uncertainty relation described above, replacing B with A 2 , we have:
, where the last inequality follows from the fact that measurements can only increase entropy.
We will use the conditional entropy of τ A1E to compute a bound on the entropy in σ A1E , thus giving us our desired keyrate computation.Before we continue, however, we require one lemma which, though straight-forward to show, we include for completeness:
Finally, we prove the following theorem which bounds the von Neumann entropy in σ allowing us to compute the keyrate of this SQKD protocol. Theorem 3. Given σ A1A2BE and τ A1A2BE as defined above in Equation 4 , let Q be the error rate in the Z basis observed on each channel individually. Also, let δ be defined as:
Then, assuming E's attack is symmetric and thus of the form E = (1/2, (I A1 ⊗ V )Rw), where V acts on H A2E and Rw is a "rewind" operator as discussed earlier, it holds that
, where:
Proof. (See full version of this paper for the complete proof [8] .) Let U be an arbitrary attack operator used against Π * (this is an isometry from H A1A2 to H A1A2E ). Also, let |φ ± = 1 √ 2 (|00 ± |11 ) be two Bell states. Without loss of generality, we may write U 's action as:
where |e ± ab are arbitrary, not necessarily normalized nor orthogonal, states in H E . The density operator τ A Z 1 A Z 2 E (which is the state of the system when B chooses Reflect in protocol Π * and A measures both her qubits in the Z basis -an operation denoted by M below) when faced with this attack is found to be:
Likewise, we may compute σ, the density operator for those iterations where B chooses Measure and Resend:
.
From the above, it is not difficult to see:
. Thus, by concavity of conditional entropy, we have:
Recall that we are actually interested in proving security against Π SQKD and so only need to concern ourselves with attacks of the form: U = (I A1 ⊗ V )Rw. From Equation 3, and noting that, since we are assuming a symmetric attack in that p 0 = p 1 = 1/2 and so q 2 0 = q 2 1 , the action of Rw on |φ ± is:
where we useq 0 to mean 1 − q 2 0 (and similarly forq 1 ) and where |e and |f are defined in Equation 2. Now, we may, without loss of generality, describe V 's action as follows (recall V is a unitary operator acting on H A2E ):
Thus, after applying attack U = (I A1 ⊗ V ) · Rw to |φ ± , we find:
It is not difficult to translate this to notation used in Equation 6 . Our goal is to determine a bound on S(A Z 1 |E) µ using S(A Z 1 |E) τ . To do so, we will use a continuity bound on conditional entropy determined by Winter in [12] (a tighter version of the Alicki-Fannes inequality [13] ). Using this bound, we have:
where:
Thus, if we bound the trace distance between τ and µ we can determine an upperbound on S(A Z 1 |E) µ thus giving us our result. Assuming the attack is symmetric, with Q being the Z basis noise in each channel (i.e., the probability of a |i flipping to a |1 − i in either channel is Q), then it is easy to see that
and also:
(Note that these values are observable by A and B in both Π * and Π SQKD .) By the triangle inequality and Lemma 2, it can be shown that:
, and setting = 4Q(1 − Q), we have:
Combining with Equation 7 , and also noting that, since µ A Z 1 E is a cq-state, and so S(A Z 1 |E) µ ≥ 0, completes the proof.
Note that the symmetry assumption could be removed -only additional algebra would be required, but the technique would be identical. The key-rate of the protocol Π * res , therefore, is:
and δ is defined in Theorem 3. Of course, by our analysis conducted above, the key-rate of Π SQKD can only be higher. An evaluation of our new key-rate bound shows that it produces a higher noise tolerance than previous best-known work without mismatched measurements [2] (our new bound shows a noise tolerance of 6.14% whereas old work showed only 5.34% when Q X = Q). However, our new bound is not as high as that found using mismatched measurements (which produces a noise tolerance of 11%) [3] . However, mismatched measurements requires over 12 different measurement statistics (thus wasting quantum communication) to bound E's information and the evaluation of lengthy equations. Here, we use only three measurement statistics -the Z basis noise in each channel and the X basis noise in the joint channel. Thus, it is not surprising our noise tolerance here is lower. An interesting open question is whether this difference is primarily an artifact of our proof (in particular, Theorem 3 may not be tight) or whether this shows the necessity of using mismatched statistics for this protocol.
Comment on General Attacks -Normally, one may extend the computations done for collective attacks to produce security against general attacks, in the asymptotic scenario, for protocols which are permutation invariant (which Π SQKD is) [14] . It seems like this should also hold for our security proof here, however, due to our reliance on the restricted collective attack, this would require a more rigorous proof [15] . We suspect the results and computations in this paper would carry through to security against general attacks, however we leave a formal proof of this as future work.
IV. CLOSING REMARKS
In this paper, we presented an entirely new proof of security for a semi-quantum protocol. Furthermore, our new key-rate has a higher noise tolerance than previous work without mismatched measurements. Of course, our new key-rate has a lower tolerance than when using mismatched measurements. An open question worth investigating is whether mismatched measurements are absolutely required for this protocol to achieve optimal noise tolerance. However, these new techniques we developed in this paper may hold great application for other (S)QKD protocols relying on a two-way channel where mismatched measurements quickly become intractable.
